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How to Get Away with Murder: Criminal and Civil Immunity Provisions in “Stand Your
Ground” Legislation
Jennifer Randolph*
I.

Introduction

At approximately seven p.m. on February 26, 2012, seventeen-year old Trayvon Martin
was shot and killed in an Orlando-area neighborhood by neighborhood watch leader George
Zimmerman.1 While the events that triggered the shooting are clouded in controversy, it remains
uncontested that Martin was unarmed and on his return from the local convenience store.2
Though Zimmerman admitted to firing the shot that killed Martin, he asserted that it was done in
self-defense.3 Zimmerman was neither immediately arrested nor charged after the incident.4 In
the months that followed, the case gained national attention5 and placed Florida’s “Stand Your
Ground” law under scrutiny. In particular, the initial decision by police not to arrest Zimmerman
sparked protest from both the public6 and the Martin family.7 Sanford Police Chief Bill Lee

* J.D. Candidate, 2014 Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., The College of New Jersey. Special thanks to
Professor John Kip Cornwell for his guidance throughout this writing of this Comment.
1
Julia Dahl, The Trayvon Martin Case Exposes the Realities of a New Generation of Self-Defense Laws, CBSNEWS
(Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57398005-504083/the-trayvon-martin-case-exposesthe-realities-of-a-new-generation-of-self-defense-laws/.
2
Id. The facts surrounding the incident are not completely clear. Zimmerman called 911 to report a “real suspicious
black guy” in the neighborhood. Though the 911 operator told Zimmerman not to chase after Martin, Zimmerman
followed the seventeen-year-old and an altercation ensued. Zimmerman states that Martin knocked him to the
ground with a punch to the nose, smashed his head into the ground, and attempted to take his gun. On April 11,
2012, Zimmerman was ultimately charged with second-degree murder and a lesser offense of manslaughter. See
The Travvon Martin Case: A Timeline, THE WEEK (Jul. 17, 2012), http://theweek.com/article/index/226211/thetrayvon-martin-case-a-timeline [hereinafter Timeline]. Interestingly, Zimmerman chose not to assert immunity
under Florida law, but, instead, to rely on the affirmative defense of self-defense. Seni Tienabeso & Matt Guttman,
George Zimmerman’s Decision Leads to Summer Trial, ABCNEWS (Apr. 30, 2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmerman-waives-stand-ground-hearing-heads-trial/story?id=19074241.
Following a jury trial, Zimmerman was acquitted. Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman is Acquitted in
Trayvon Martin Killing, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2013, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-trayvon-martin.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
3
Dahl, supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
In April of 2012 30% of Americans indicated they were following the Trayvon Martin case more than any other
story. Timeline, supra note 3.
6
See Patrik Jonsson, Trayvon Martin Case Reveals Confusion Over How Stand Your Ground Works. THE
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2012/0411/Trayvon-Martincase-reveals-confusion-over-how-Stand-Your-Ground-works.
7
See Timeline, supra note 3.
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stated in a press conference on March 12, 2012, “[i]n this case Mr. Zimmerman has made the
statement of self-defense . . . .Until we can establish probable cause to dispute that, we don’t
have the grounds to arrest him.”8 This statement reflects the implications of an immunity
provision passed in 2005 as a part of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground Law.”9 Since 2005, upwards
of 20 states have passed similar “Stand Your Ground” statutes containing provisions for criminal
immunity, civil immunity, or both for persons “justified” in using force.10
This Comment does not begin with the story of Trayvon Martin to incite discussion on
the outcome of the case, or to proffer an opinion regarding the veracity of Zimmerman’s defense,
but to serve as an instructive starting point demonstrating the implications of one type of
immunity now granted to many defendants asserting a claim of self-defense. The goal of this
Comment is to explore the various types of immunity granted by recent “Stand Your Ground”
laws, to highlight the problematic aspects of these provisions, and to recommend change for the
legislation. Part II of this article provides a background to self-defense law and examples of how
previous immunity provisions functioned. Next, the article focuses on the new “Stand Your
Ground” laws and how the addition of civil and criminal immunity changed traditional self8

See Dahl, supra note 1. The police chief later stepped down following a “vote of no-confidence from the city.”
Cora Currier, The 24 States That Have Sweeping Self-Defense Laws Just Like Florida’s, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 22,
2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-23-states-that-have-sweeping-self-defense-laws-just-like-floridas.
9
See FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (West 2013).
10
See Wyatt Holliday, Comment, “The Answer to Criminal Aggression is Retaliation:” Stand Your Ground Laws
and the Liberalization of Self-Defense, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 407, 407 (2012); P. Luevonda Ross, The
Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle Association-Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to
the Right to Stand Your Ground, 35 S.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(d) (2012); ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 09.65.330 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (West 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West
2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.085 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2800.19 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922b (West 2012); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-15(5)(b)
(West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.074 (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:1-a (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-51.2(e) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-05-07.2 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.60(2)(B)(c) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (West 2012); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
8340.2 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-450 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-22(d) (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
895.62(2) (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-204 (West 2012). Though additional states have amended their
self-defense statutes to reflect traditional aspects of “Stand Your Ground” legislation, the previous list reflects those
that have added some form of immunity provision since the enactment of the Florida statute in 2005. The specific
aspects of these state laws will be discussed in the sections that follow.
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defense procedures and law. Part IV focuses on laws granting criminal immunity and highlights
problematic aspects of their implementation. Part V focuses on statutes granting civil immunity
and their possible implications.

Then, Part VI makes recommendations for change or

amendment to these statutes. Finally, Part VII concludes.
II.

Self-Defense and Immunity Provisions Before 2005

A typical “Stand Your Ground” law is a doctrine of self-defense that allows a person to
meet force, including deadly force, with corresponding force.11

These laws traditionally

eliminate any existing duty to retreat and provide for some form of criminal or tort immunity.12
These laws are premised on, and justified by, the idea that a law-abiding citizen should be
permitted to “protect themselves, their families, and others from intruders and attackers without
fear of prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of themselves and others.” 13 This section
looks at traditional self-defense law and immunity provisions, while the subsequent sections
detail how immunity provisions in “Stand Your Ground” laws have altered the “traditional” both
substantively and procedurally. Substantively, the “Stand Your Ground” laws have expanded
state self-defense law by both removing the duty to retreat, in those states that retain it14 and
adding a presumption of reasonable force when the force is used in the home or car. 15
Procedurally, the new “Stand Your Ground” laws generally prohibit arrest without probable
11

See generally Andrea A. Amoa, Note and Comment, Texas Issues a Formidable License to Kill: A Critical
Analysis of the Joe Horn Shootings and the Castle Doctrine, 33 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 293, 297–98 (2008)
(describing Texas’ “Stand Your Ground” law); Jason W. Bobo, Comment, Following the Trend: Alabama
Abandons the Duty to Retreat and Encourages Citizens to Stand Their Ground, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 339, 361–63
(2008) (describing Alabama’s “Stand Your Ground” law); Wyatt Holliday, Comment, “The Answer to Criminal
Aggression is Retaliation:” Stand-Your Ground Laws and the Liberalization of Self-Defense, 43 U. TOL. L. REV.
407, 425–28, 431–33 (2012) (describing Ohio’s and Wisconsin’s “Stand Your Ground” laws); Judith Koons,
Gunsmoke and Legal Mirrors: Women Surviving Intimate Battery and Deadly Legal Doctrines, 14 J.L. & POL’Y
617, 618 n.3 (2006) (describing Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law).
12
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (West 2012).
13
See Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (quoting the preamble to § 776.032 of the Florida statutes);
David Kopel, Florida’s New Self Defense Law, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 19, 2005, 11:24 AM),
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1116516262.shtml.
14
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2012). See generally text accompanying notes 116–122.
15
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2012). See generally text accompanying notes 116–122.
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cause that unlawful force was used,16 permit pre-trial immunity hearings for persons asserting
self-defense,17 and prevent remedies in the civil courts when a person asserts statutory
immunity.18
A. Self-Defense: Substance, Procedure, and Theory
“Every state in the United States recognizes a defense for the use of force, including
deadly force, in self-protection.”19 In 1806, one of the first self-defense cases was considered by
an American court.20 In Commonwealth v. Selfridge, the defendant, Selfridge, was charged with
manslaughter for the death of Charles Austin, a young Harvard student.21 In his jury instruction,
Judge Parker articulated the basic concept of self-defense, “[w]hen . . . there is reasonable
ground to believe that there is a design to destroy his life . . . then killing the assailant will be
excusable . . . although it should afterwards appear that no felony was intended . . . .”22 Judge
Parker went on to proffer a hypothetical in which the defendant (“A”) is faced with an
opponent/victim waving a gun.23 In the hypothetical, the defendant kills the victim only to later
find out that the gun contained blanks instead of bullets.24 Judge Parker questioned, “Will any
reasonable man say that A is more criminal than he would have been if there had been a bullet in
the pistol?”25 Though both the instruction and the hypothetical offered by Judge Parker have

16

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).
See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29–30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
18
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012).
19
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 223 (5th ed. 2009).
20
Ross, supra note 10, at 6.
21
Id. Selfridge, a lawyer and aspiring politician, had squabbled with the victim’s father, Benjamin Austin, over the
posting of slanderous comments about him in the local newspaper. Id. Following these comments, the situation
intensified and Selfridge armed himself. Id. Selfridge was met with the younger Austin on the street and in
possession of a cane; an altercation ensued resulting in the death of Charles Austin by the gun of Selfridge. Id.
22
Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II-Honest But Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self-Defense, 28
B.C. L. REV. 459, 477 (1987).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
17
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been criticized as “off-point”26 in the context of the Selfridge fact-pattern, the ideas represented
by this decision remain a part of American self-defense law.27
Traditionally, a person was justified in his or her use of force if he or she reasonably
believed that force was necessary to prevent the imminent use of unlawful force against him or
her by another.28

With this standard, a person need not experience actual harm so long as he

possessed a reasonable belief that such harm was imminent.29 Deadly force was permitted only
in situations where the actor had a reasonable belief that he was facing the imminent use of
unlawful deadly force.30 In both instances the defense was qualified by the requirement that the
person asserting the defense be a “non-aggressor” in the altercation that gave rise to the use of
force.31
Generally, a person who claims self-defense raises an affirmative defense, arguing that
the use of force was justified, in either a criminal or civil proceeding.32 For the most part, there
is no substantive difference between the assertion of self-defense in a criminal matter and a civil
or tort matter; therefore, the previous discussion reflects the construct of the defense in either

26

Singer opines that because Selfridge’s indictment was for manslaughter, not murder, and his shot was unlikely to
have been the result of a “mistake” as to the amount of force necessary, the fact-pattern of Selfridge is not ideal for a
discussion of self-defense. See id.
27
See State v. Light, 664 S.E.2d 465, 469 (S.C. 2008) (holding that a defendant was entitled to an instruction of selfdefense when he was approached with a firearm); Koritta v. State, 438 S.E.2d 68, 69–70 (Ga. 1994) (holding that the
defendant was entitled to a self-defense instruction in an altercation involving a gun).
28
DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 223.
29
See Lydia Zbrzenj, Note, Florida’s Controversial Gun Policy: Liberally Permitting Citizens to Arm Themselves
and Broadly Recognizing the Right to Act in Self-Defense, 13 F. COASTAL. L. REV. 231, 233 (2012).
30
DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 223 (emphasis in original).
31
Id. at 226 (defining aggressor as “one who threatens unlawfully to commit a battery upon another or who
provokes a physical conflict by words or actions calculated to bring about an assault”).
32
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1416 (West 2012). This statute exemplifies this statement. In subsection
(1) of the statute it provides that “In any prosecution based on conduct which is justifiable under sections 28-1406 to
28-1416, justification is an affirmative defense.” Id. at § 28-1416(1). In subsection (2) of the statute, it
acknowledges the same range of sections and provides that they serve as an affirmative defense to a civil action as
well. Id. at § 28-1416(2). Within the range of applicable sections is the justification for the use of force. See id. at §
28-1409.
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situation.33

The most critical procedural difference is in the burden placed upon both the

plaintiff/prosecutor and the defendant in either situation.34 In a criminal matter, the prosecution
bears the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.35 States differ,
however, on the burden of proof that is placed on the defendant with respect to an affirmative
defense.36 Comparatively, in a civil matter, the burden of both pleading and proving self-defense
is on the defendant who seeks to justify his or her actions. 37

This must be done by a

preponderance of the evidence.38 No matter where the burden lies in various states, however, the
ultimate decision traditionally rested in the hands of the judge or jury deciding the matter at
trial.39
Traditionally, the recognition of self-defense as an affirmative defense rested on the
premise that certain actions are “justified” by their circumstances. 40 “Justification” defenses
typically provide protection for actions that are considered warranted by the situation.41 For
example, a driver of a fire engine may speed en route to an emergency, in violation of local
33

Caroline Forell, Symposium, Who is the Reasonable Person? What’s Reasonable?: Self-Defense and Mistake in
Criminal and Tort Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1403 (2010); see also 33 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D
Privileged Use of Force in Self-Defense § 1 (2012) [hereinafter Privileged Use of Force] (“There are few, if any,
substantive distinctions between civil and criminal law with regard to the prerequisites to justification of a claim of
self-defense, and, with the exception of the rule of evidence which gives to a person accused of a crime the benefit
of a reasonable doubt the law of self-defense is the same in both criminal and civil cases.”); supra text
accompanying notes 19–31 (describing the substance of self-defense law).
34
See Privileged Use of Force, supra note 33, at § 1.
35
See id. at § 7; Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457,
458 (1989) (“In the criminal trial setting, the presumption of innocence is given vitality primarily through the
requirement that the government prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
36
See Privileged Use of Force, supra note 33, at § 7. In some states, the defendant is required to prove that he acted
in self-defense “either by a preponderance of the evidence, by the greater weight of the evidence, by convincing
evidence, by proof to the satisfaction of the jury, or by proof raising a reasonable doubt.” Id. Other states leave the
burden on the prosecutor to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was not acting in self-defense. Id.
States may also require that the defendant produce evidence that he or she acted in self-defense and leave the burden
of persuasion on the prosecution. Id.
37
Id. at § 8.
38
Id.
39
Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Elizabeth Cateforis, Self-Defense, What’s a Jury Got To Do With It?, 57 U. KAN. L. REV.
1143, 1153 (2009). This is one aspect of self-defense law that is altered significantly by the new legislation; see
infra Part III.
40
See Marcia Baron, Justifications and Excuses, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 387, 388–89 (2005); Zbrzenj, supra note 22,
at 234.
41
Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1900 (1984).
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traffic laws; however, the driver’s behavior would be considered warranted because the risk of
harm associated with the fire is greater than the traffic risk created by the truck’s speed.42
Members of society would not only accept the driver’s actions, but they would hope that drivers
in that same position would take the same action.43 By contrast, defenses such as insanity are
considered “excuse” defenses.44

“Excuse” defenses relieve the individual actor of blame for

their actions; here the same actions would not be excused for other persons.45 For example, an
employee who has extreme mental and emotional issues, flies into a fit of rage, and hits a coworker may be wholly or partially excused from liability because of his or her diminished mental
state.46 The same strike by any other person, however, would not receive protection.47
This categorization not only draws distinction by title, it reflects a distinction in moral
principles as well.48 “[T]o say that an action is justified is to say . . . that though the action is of a
type that is usually wrong, in these circumstances it was not wrong. To say that an action is
excused, by contrast, is to say that it was indeed wrong . . . but the agent is not blameworthy.” 49
Taking this one step further, one scholar opines that the policy justifying self-defense is the very
same which underlies the creation of the crimes it serves as a defense to, i.e. offenses against the
person such as murder, battery or rape.50 Specifically, it is the societal interest in life and bodily
integrity that is paramount to the justification of self-defense and to the creation of crimes which

42

Id. at 1899.
Id.
44
Baron, supra note 40, at 388–89 (noting also that “some defenses are difficult to classify”).
45
Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 1900.
46
Id. at 1899–1900.
47
Id. at 1900.
48
Baron, supra note 40, at 389. Baron acknowledges that most persons would prefer to have an action deemed
justified versus excused. Id.
49
See id. at 388–90.
50
Janine Young Kim, Rule and Exception in Criminal Law (Or, Are Criminal Defenses Necessary?), 82 TUL. L.
REV. 247, 278 (2007).
43

7

intend to prohibit harmful use of force.51 This same respect for human life is diminished under
new “Stand Your Ground” laws that permit complete immunity from criminal or civil action.
B. Self-Defense: Deadly Force and the Duty to Retreat
Recognizing the value of human life, English common law embraced a duty to retreat “as
far as he conveniently or safely can” when in the face of deadly force.52 This duty reflected a
historical reluctance to legitimize the right of self-defense when it involved defensive killing.53
An exception to the duty to retreat existed, however, when a man was attacked in his own
home.54 Reflecting the conviction that “a man’s home is his castle,” this exception became
known as the Castle Doctrine.55 Therefore, a man faced with deadly force in his own home had
no duty to retreat to safety before responding with force, including deadly force. 56
Beginning in the nineteenth century, there was a dramatic movement in the United States
to abandon the duty to retreat in the face of deadly force.57 Resentment towards the duty to
retreat grew as a result of the view that to require such a duty was to require cowardice.58 Thus,
a majority of modern American self-defense statutes utilize a “no retreat” rule that permits a nonaggressor to utilize deadly force in the face of an unlawful deadly attack, even if retreat to safety
is possible.59 The minority of states that maintain the duty to retreat in the face of deadly force,

51

Id.
See Bobo, supra note 11, at 362; Benjamin Levin, Note, A Defensible Defense?: Reexamining Castle Doctrine
Statutes, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 528 (2010) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 423).
53
See Levin, supra note 52, at 528.
54
Id. at 530.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Levin, supra note 52, at 529.
58
Bobo, supra note 11, at 343; see also Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the
Twenty-First Century, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 504, 507 (2007) (“The American ideals of bravery and honor
suited themselves to frontier life in a way that the English duty to retreat could not.”).
59
See Bobo, supra note 52, at 343; DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 229.
52
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however, continue to embrace the English common law Castle Doctrine exception.60 The Model
Penal Code, for example, states that an “actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place
of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by another person
whose place of work the actor knows it to be.”61 The Castle Doctrine acknowledges the idea that
the home is a sanctuary from which a person should not be forced to flee in the face of a threat
serious bodily injury or death.62
Abrogation of the duty to retreat became evident first in the state supreme courts.63 In
Erwin v. State, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a “true man” should not be
required to retreat from an “assailant, who . . . maliciously seeks to take his life.”64 Similarly, in
Runyan v. State the Indiana Supreme Court found that the “American mind” weighed against
imposing a duty to retreat.65 The Supreme Court followed suit, essentially rejecting the duty to
retreat in the 1921 case Brown v. United States.66 In Brown, the defendant was convicted of the
murder of Hermis, a man who was reportedly attacking the defendant with a knife at the time
that he fired the fatal shot.67 Though it was requested by the defense, the lower court refused to
give a jury instruction that retreat was unnecessary if the defendant reasonably feared for his

60

Id. at 531; see also People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914) (“It is not now and never has been the law
that a man assailed in his own dwelling is bound to retreat.”); State v. Middleham, 17 N.W. 446, 448 (Iowa 1883)
(stating that there is no duty to retreat in one’s home).
61
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(1) (Official Draft 1985).
62
See Zbrzenj, supra note 29, at 238–39.
63
Bobo, supra note 11, at 344; see, e.g., Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80 (1877); Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (Ohio
1876).
64
Erwin, 29 Ohio St. at 199. In Erwin, the defendant and his son-in-law were in a dispute over the possession of a
storage shed that was located in-between their two homes. The day that the homicide took place, Erwin was in the
shed and his son-in-law approached him with an ax in an apparently threatening manner. Erwin responded with a
single shot that resulted in the death of his son-in-law. Id. at 192–93.
65
Runyan, 57 Ind. at 84. Runyan was convicted of manslaughter of Charles Pressnal. The deceased hit him two or
three times before Runyan pulled a pistol out of his pocket and shot him. Id at 81.
66
256 U.S. 335 (1921); see also Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 563–64 (1895) (holding that there is no duty
to retreat when a person is on the premises of their dwelling and faced with deadly force).
67
Brown, 256 U.S. at 341–42.
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life.68 Instead, the court instructed the jury that the defendant had a duty to retreat. 69 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari70 and Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the Court,
stated:
Many respectable writers agree that if a man reasonably believes
that he is in immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm
from his assailant he may stand his ground and that if he kills him
he has not exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defense . . .
Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an
uplifted knife. Therefore in this Court, at least, it is not a condition
of immunity that one in that situation should pause to consider
whether a reasonable man might not think it possible to fly with
safety or to disable his assailant rather than to kill him.71
Justice Holmes’ opinion not only gives credence to the abolition of the duty to retreat in the face
of deadly force in American jurisdictions, but it also highlights the beginnings of the ideas
underlying “Stand Your Ground” legislation.72 The use of the term “immunity” in this opinion,
however, does not reflect its use in the new legislation.73
C. Immunity: Public Officials and Self-Defense
Immunity, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, is “any exemption from a duty, liability
or service of process.”74 Traditionally, immunity for an individual defendant has been based

68

Id. at 342.
Id.
70
Id. at 341.
71
Id. at 343. (emphasis added). It is interesting to highlight within this description the use of “stand his ground” and
“immunity.”
72
See generally Christine Cantalfamo, Note, Stand Your Ground: Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-First
Century, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 504, 509 (2007) (noting that an “increased understanding of human nature
and the complex moral measurements required by the duty to retreat” lead to the privilege of non-retreat and that
this realization was evident in the Holmes opinion). The Brown decision serves as persuasive authority for those
states dealing with issues of the duty to retreat in self-defense law. See Bobo, supra note 11, at 351. It follows that
it also serves some persuasive authority for the “Stand Your Ground” laws.
73
See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (holding that the Florida law entitled a defendant to a
pretrial hearing regarding immunity from prosecution for lawful use of force, not merely an affirmative defense of
self-defense at trial).
74
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 817 (9th ed. 2009).
69
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upon his or her status as a public official.75 The recent “Stand Your Ground” legislation,
however, grants immunity to defendants who are justified in their use of force. 76

To distinguish

between the concept of an affirmative defense, like self-defense, and the concept of “immunity”
it is helpful to examine the conceptual difference between a defense from liability and a defense
from suit.77 Affirmative defenses generally come in the form of defenses from liability, i.e. a
defense that admits to the elements that comprise the claim but desires to “justify, excuse, or
mitigate the commission of the act.”78 By contrast, immunity, like that typically granted public
officials, is designed to operate as a defense from suit before the merits of a case are reached.79
It is interesting to note that public officials, such as police officers and prosecutors, are
often afforded a “qualified,” but not complete, immunity for their actions.80 The doctrine of
qualified immunity grants protection to public officials from “liability for civil damages insofar
75

See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (noting that legislators are privileged and immune from
arrest or civil process while performing legislative duty); Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial
Immunity, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 53 (2005) (discussing absolute and qualified prosecutorial immunity); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (permitting qualified immunity to shield government officials from actions
under § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known”). As noted by the Supreme Court in Pearson v. Callahan, doctrines such as
“qualified immunity” are intended to protect public officers from distraction, harassment, and liability while
requiring them to remain accountable for the irresponsible exercise of power. 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); see also
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350 (2009) (recognizing that the doctrine of qualified immunity can shield officers
form liability).
76
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.65.330 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-324.2 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West 2012); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 503.085 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.19 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.2922b (West 2012); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-15(5)(b) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.074 (West 2012);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:1-a (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51.2(e) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §
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ANN. § 55-7-22(d) (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.62(2) (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-204 (West
2012).
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Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 803, 818 (1982) (acknowledging that the purpose of qualified immunity is to “avoid excessive
disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment”).
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accompanying notes 40–44.
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as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”81 The doctrine exists to balance the public’s desire to
hold officials accountable for their actions and the officials’ desire to be shielded from liability
when they perform their duties in a reasonable manner.82 Qualified immunity acts as immunity
from suit, not a defense to liability.83
Though immunity provisions contained in, or related to, self-defense laws are relatively
new, they are not a completely novel concept. Prior to the outbreak of “Stand Your Ground”
legislation featuring immunity provisions or statutes in 2005, a Colorado statute similarly
granted immunity to persons defending their home.84 Enacted in 1985, Colorado statute section
18-1-704.5 provides immunity from both civil and criminal prosecution to those utilizing force,
including deadly force, in the face of an unlawful intruder.85 The statute’s purpose, as evident in
its text, is to recognize the citizens’ “right to expect absolute safety within their own homes.”86
This justification bears striking similarity to that for the Castle Doctrine. 87 The Supreme Court
of Colorado clarified, however, that this immunity was provided only when there is a known
unlawful entry into the home.88 This requirement for unlawful entry makes the Colorado statute
slightly more restrictive than the Castle Doctrine which provides a defense for the use of force in
one’s home qualified only by the requirement that the individual is not the initial aggressor.89
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See id.
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
83
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
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88
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In 1987, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the language of the statute provided for
more than just an affirmative defense to liability.90 The court held that the statute created the
need for a pretrial determination of a defendant’s immunity from prosecution.91 In rendering
their decision, the court looked at both the plain language of the statute, as well as the definition
of immunity provided by Black’s Law Dictionary, and determined that the statute rendered any
proceeding against an immune party improper.92 Procedurally, this required a pre-trial hearing at
which the defendant was required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she
was entitled to immunity under the statute.93

The pre-trial hearing was to be held

contemporaneous with, or immediately following, the preliminary hearing.94 Specifically, this
required the defendant to prove:
(1) Another person made an unlawful entry into the defendant’s
dwelling; (2) the defendant had a reasonable belief that such other
person had committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the
unvented entry, or was commiting [sic] or [intending] to commit a
crime against a person or property in addition to the unvented
entry; (3) the defendant reasonably believed that such other person
might use physical force, no matter [how] slight, against any
occupant of the dwelling; (4) the defendant used force against the
person who actually made the unlawful entry into the dwelling.95
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People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 978 (Colo. 1987).
See id.
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Id. at 975
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Id. at 978.
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Id.at 979 n.5.
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16-3-23, -24, -24.1, and-24.2, 59 MERCER L. REV. 629, 652 (2008).
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A defendant availing themselves to the pre-trial immunity proceeding is not later precluded from
the assertion of self-defense as an affirmative defense at trial.96 Further, the decision by the court
at the pre-trial is not considered a “final decision” subject to later appeal.97
While the Colorado courts interpreted their statute to provide for a pretrial determination
of immunity, other courts interpreting similar language prior to 2005 declined to find the creation
of an independent grant of immunity.98 Like Justice Holmes use of “immunity” in the Brown
decision,99 other states have interpreted their statutes to provide for nothing more than the
traditional affirmative defense.100 In Indiana, for example, the self-defense statute provided that
no person would be placed in legal jeopardy for “protecting himself or his family by reasonable
means necessary”101

The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the contention that this statute

required a pretrial hearing to evaluate the legitimacy of a self-defense claim before subjecting a
person to the “legal jeopardy” of a trial, holding instead that the language was a mere reflection
of public policy of the state.102 Similarly, in Arizona, a statute originally enacted in 1970 stated,
“[n]o person in this state shall be subject to civil liability for engaging in conduct otherwise
justified pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.”103 The statute was challenged in Pfeil v.
Smith, in which the defendant argued that her acquittal for justified conduct in a criminal charge
was sufficient, under section 13-413 of the Arizona Code, to acquit her of subsequent civil
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See Wood v. People, 255 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Colo. 2011); Montanez v. State, 24 So.3d 799, 801 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010 (noting that defendant would still be permitted to assert self-defense even though he was denied
immunity).
97
Id.
98
See, e.g., Loza v. State, 325 N.E.2d 173, 176 (Ind. 1975); Pfeil v. Smith, 900 P.2d 12, 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
99
See supra text accompanying notes 69–71.
100
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-413 (2012).
101
See Loza v. State, 325 N.E.2d 173, 176 (Ind. 1975).
102
Id. The statute at issue in Loza has since been amended; however, the new legislation contains similar language.
See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2(c) (West 2012) (“No person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any
kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.”).
103
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-413 (2012).
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charges filed.104

The court, however, held that the statute did nothing more than to allow a

person to assert the affirmative defense of self-defense in a civil case.105
III.

The Change in Self-Defense and the Addition of Immunity

A. Florida: Where it all began
The movement towards broader self-defense legislation and immunity provisions began
in Florida in 2005.106 Conceived of by former National Rifle Association (NRA) President
Marion P. Hammer, Florida’s Protection of Persons Bill passed unanimously in the Senate and
by overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives.107 It was promptly signed into law
by Governor Jeb Bush on April 26, 2005108 and became effective October 1, 2005.109 Prior to
2005, self-defense law in Florida combined statutory and common law and encompassed a duty
to retreat.110 Florida’s self-defense statute 776.012 permitted the use of force if the defendant
reasonably believed they faced imminent death or great bodily harm.111 Criminal prosecution
prior to the new legislation permitted a person charged with a crime involving force, including
homicide, to raise an affirmative defense of self-defense, but it did not provide for a pre-trial
determination of that defense.112 A prima facie case of self-defense under the old self-defense
statute consisted of: (1) a reasonable belief (2) that deadly force was necessary to prevent
imminent death (3) to himself or herself (4) or another (5) or to prevent the imminent
104

Pfeil v. Smith, 900 P.2d 12, 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 15.
106
Ross, supra note 10, at 18.
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See Daniel Michael, Recent Development: Florida’s Protection of Persons Bill, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 199, 199;
Manuel Roig-Franzia, Florida Gun Law to Expand Leeway for Self-Defense, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/25/AR2005042501553.html.
108
Zachary Weaver, Note, “Stand Your Ground” Law: The Actual Effects and the Need for Clarification, 63 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 395, 395.
109
See Michael, supra note 107, at 200.
110
Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999).
111
Hernandez v. State, 842 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2003) (“Section 776.012, Florida
Statutes (1997), permits the use of deadly force against another, ‘only if he or she reasonably believes that such
force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself.’ Whether a person was
justified in using deadly force is a question of fact for the jury to decide if the facts are disputed.”).
112
See generally Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1049 (articulating Florida self-defense law in 1999).
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commission of a felony.113 Once a defendant proved a prima facie case of self-defense, the
burden shifted at trial to the state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did not
act in self-defense.114 The jury was left with the ultimate decision, to determine whether the
defendant subjectively held a belief and whether such a belief was objectively reasonable.115
The 2005 “Stand Your Ground” law substantially amended Florida’s pre-existing statutes
by eliminating the duty to retreat,116 establishing a presumption that force was used reasonably
when faced with an unlawful intruder in the home or occupied vehicle,117 and expanding the
right of an individual to use force, including deadly force, without the possibility of criminal or
civil consequences.118 With respect to this last aspect, immunity, the law stated:

“A person

who uses force as permitted in § 776.012, § 776.013, or § 776.031 is justified in using such
force and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action . . . ."119 It further defined the
term criminal prosecution to include “arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or
prosecuting the defendant.”120
Most provocatively, the new law prohibits arrest until there is probable cause to support
the belief that the use of force was unlawful.121 In describing the dramatic change to self-defense
law, the Florida Supreme Court in Dennis v. State stated:
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While Florida law has long recognized that a defendant may argue
as an affirmative defense at trial that his or her use of force was
legally justified, section 776.032 contemplates that a defendant
who establishes entitlement to the statutory immunity will not be
subjected to trial . . . The statute does not merely provide that a
defendant cannot be convicted as a result of legally justified
force.122
The Florida legislature was the first to pass a comprehensive update of its self-defense law
pursuant to NRA lobbying, but they were most certainly not the last.123
B. The Followers
Due to the success of the legislation in Florida, the NRA increased its efforts to have
similar legislation passed across the country.124 Since 2005, more than half of the states have
enacted or considered similar legislation to Florida.125 This Comment specifically focuses on
those containing provisions granting the accused immunity from civil and/or criminal liability for
justified use of force.
1. Criminal and Civil Immunity: Florida and its Followers
At least five states have enacted statutes which include immunity provisions having the
same language as Florida, including:
Carolina.126

Alabama, Oklahoma, Kansas, Kentucky, and South

North Carolina enacted a statute containing substantially similar language to

Florida’s legislation; however, it does not contain a section specifically prohibiting an officer
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from arresting an individual without probable cause that the force used was unlawful.127 These
statutes broadly immunize a defendant from both criminal and civil liability.128 Other states have
adopted statutes with different language, though their effects will likely be similar.129 For
example, the statute enacted in Georgia provides that a person “shall be immune from criminal
prosecution” for lawful use of force, but it does not provide the same immunity from civil
liability.130
Not all of these statutes have been interpreted by their respective state courts; however,
the supreme courts of at least three states have acknowledged that the statute provides for a pretrial immunity hearing.131 For example, the Florida Supreme Court in Dennis v. State held that
the “plain language of section 776.032 grants defendants a substantive right to assert immunity
from prosecution and to avoid being subjected to a trial.”132 This right, though similar to the
pretrial immunity determination granted to residents of Colorado,133 is potentially more
encompassing as it applies to self-defense claims as well as defenses of habitation.134 This pretrial determination grants immunity to a defendant that is substantially similar to that provided
public officials because it reflects the notion that any further procedure against an “immune”
party would be improper.135 Interestingly, Kansas has addressed the state’s immunity provision
under a petition for writ of habeas corpus.136 In McCracken v. Kohl, the defendant alleged that
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he was immune from the underlying battery prosecution and, thus, was unlawfully detained.137
Though the court rejected the defendant’s argument, finding that his use of force was unjustified,
the defendant’s argument furthers the notion that this new construct of immunity is one more
akin to a defense to suit than a defense of liability.138
C. Civil Immunity
Since 2005, approximately thirteen states have enacted statutes providing for civil
immunity for those who utilize force lawfully.139 Though the language of these statutes is not
entirely consistent, most of these statutes exist as stand-alone grants of immunity from civil
action.140 Idaho, for example, entitles their statute section 6-808 “Civil immunity for selfdefense.”141 Similarly, Tennessee entitles their statute “Use of force; civil immunity; costs and
fees.”142 Texas entitles their section 83.001 simply “Civil Immunity.”143 These titles seem to
reflect the notion that they provide some form of immunity greater than the affirmative defense
traditionally offered defendants faced with claims of civil liability.

Unfortunately, judicial

interpretation of the function of these statutes is limited. Although it seems safe to assume that
they function to prevent the assertion of claims against a defendant justified in his/her use of
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force the same way that immunity in the criminal setting protects a defendant from arrest,
detention, charging, and prosecution144 this has yet to be conclusively decided by the courts.
IV.

Problematic Aspects of Immunity in the Criminal Context

The states providing for immunity from criminal prosecution generally include arresting,
detaining, charging, and prosecuting in the definition of prosecution.145 Such a broad definition
necessarily implicates the actions of government actors in all phases of the criminal justice
process. This section examines the problematic aspects of the law with respect to each aspect of
the “prosecution” from which a person becomes immune if they use force lawfully.
A. Problems for Law Enforcement
The Florida statute, and those similar, includes “arrest” and “detaining in custody" in the
definition of prosecution from which a defendant is immune.146 The statutes go further to
specifically prohibit law enforcement from initiating an arrest until probable cause is established
that force was not used lawfully, i.e. in self-defense, defense of others, or defense of home.147
While probable cause is the constitutional standard by which police effectuate a lawful arrest,148
the law now requires that law enforcement obtain not only probable cause that a crime has
occurred, but probable cause that refutes the person’s probable affirmative defense.149
Therefore, a law enforcement officer, in the earliest stages of criminal prosecution, is tasked with

144

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1).
Id.
146
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012). The Oklahoma statute, however, includes only charging and
prosecuting in the definition of “criminal prosecution.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1289.25F (West 2012).
Interestingly, it does include the same requirement that a law enforcement agency refrain from arrest until it
determines that probable cause exists to prove the force used was unlawful. See id. at § 1289.25G.
147
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012).
148
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause"); Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (stating that, in the absence of a search warrant, "whether [an] arrest [is] constitutionally
valid depends . . . upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officer[] had probable cause to make it").
149
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012) (Immunity from criminal prosecution and civil action for justifiable use
of force). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2012) (use of force in defense of person).
145

20

evaluating the affirmative defense of the accused on scene if they desire to arrest the
individual.150
1. The Potential for Inconsistency and Abuse
Due to the lack of legislative clarity regarding the application of the immunity statute,
there is a great potential for inconsistent application of, and possible abuse of, this statute by law
enforcement.151 Notably, the law received significant opposition from the law enforcement
community prior to its original passage in Florida.152 Several urban police chiefs spoke out
against the law calling it “unnecessary and dangerous” and publicly opposing its passage. 153
With respect to its application, no statute provides clear instructions as to the required
procedures.

Section two of the Florida self-defense law,154 for example, permits law

enforcement to use “standard investigative procedures” to determine the existence of probable
cause;155 however, it does not clearly establish what those procedures entail for law enforcement
agencies across the state.156 The Eleventh Circuit in Reagan v. Mallory recognized this lack of
clarity stating, “[u]nder Florida law, law enforcement officers have a duty to assess the validity
of this defense, but they are provided minimal, if any, guidance on how to make this
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assessment.”157 While it may be true that law enforcement agencies receive training in arrest
procedures, the statute now requires them to evaluate more than just the existence of a crime.158
They are charged with both understanding the self-defense law and evaluating whether there is
probable cause to believe that such a defense would fail.159 Law enforcement officers are not
trained in this type of legal analysis.160
Complicating the decision further is the requirement that the officer prove a negative.161
The statute requires that police officers ascertain probable cause that “the force that was used is
unlawful.”162 Therefore, not only must an officer have an understanding of the reasonableness
and proportionality requirements that render use of force “unlawful” but they must have
evidence supporting the absence of lawful use of force before they arrest. Without probable
cause proving that negative, law enforcement is prohibited from arresting.163
Inconsistency is already evidenced by the incongruent treatment of factually similar cases
in the state of Florida. While there is no relevant tracking system of law enforcement decisionmaking in self-defense cases,164 much of the information demonstrating the effects of immunity
from arrest can be deduced from the media. Incidents that took place after the enactment of the
157
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“Stand Your Ground” law, provide some insight as to the impact of placing an immunity
decision on law enforcement. The case that has gained the most significant media attention is
the aforementioned Trayvon Martin case. Seventeen-year old Trayvon Martin was fatally shot
while returning from the neighborhood convenience store.165 Martin was unarmed.166 George
Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch leader, stated that he shot the boy in self-defense, and he was
not immediately arrested.167 The local police chief reported that the delayed arrest was a result
of the absence of probable cause to believe that Zimmerman had used the force unlawfully under
the Florida law.168
Comparing Zimmerman’s situation to the plight of Jimmy Ray Hair demonstrates the
consequences of inconsistent application of the law.169 In Hair v. State, Hair and the victim,
Charles Harper, were engaged in a verbal argument at a nightclub.170 As in the Trayvon Martin
case, and many self-defense cases for that matter, the facts that follow are somewhat disputed.171
Hair asserted that Harper reached into the vehicle, and the two began to struggle. 172 Hair then
pulled out his gun and fired a shot at Harper.173 The police not only arrested Harper, but he sat
for two years in jail awaiting a trial on a charge of first degree murder before eventually being
granted immunity under Florida statute 776.032.174
This lack of clarity could even lead to abuse, whether intentional or unintentional, by law
enforcement.175

Officers draw their own subjective conclusions from a situation.
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If, for

example, an officer feels that the individual “victim” in an altercation where the Castle Doctrine
or self-defense is invoked “deserved” what was coming to him, the officer may decline to arrest
or to thoroughly investigate the incident.176 Normally, an officer would be required to arrest if
probable cause exists that the crime occurred, regardless of their subjective assessment of the
situation, and the existence of a victim would likely permit them to effectuate that arrest.177 With
immunity, however, a single officer has the ability to decline to arrest, and this decision could
potentially be influenced by his or her own subjective assessment of the situation.178

By

contrast, if the issue of self-defense were to reach trial, the persuasiveness of the perpetrators
claim of self-defense would be assessed by a jury179 comprised of a cross-section of the
community.180 Thus, permitting a single officer to render a decision regarding a potential
defendant’s immunity detracts from the benefits of both the multiplicity and the diversity of the
decision-maker that is embodied in jury trials.181
This possibility for abuse is highlighted in a story reported in Clearwater, Florida.182
Kenneth Allen, a retired police officer, and his neighbor, Jason Rosenbloom argued on prior
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occasions due to Rosenbloom’s failure to follow local codes.183 On the day of the incident, Allen
heard loud music coming from Rosenbloom’s house,184 Rosenbloom came to his door and began
threatening to make Allen’s life miserable.185 Allen closed the door and got a pistol from
nearby.186 Rosenbloom refused to leave and began to rush into the house.187 Allen fired a
shot.188 Police never arrested Allen who claimed that he was trying to stop a potential “home
invasion,” and to “keep his house safe.”189 Among the possible foundations for the decision not
to arrest may be the fact Allen was a retired police officer. This type of inconsistency and abuse
is severely problematic.
2. Law Enforcement as the Prosecutor, Judge, and Jury
In granting immunity from arrest and detention, Florida statute section 776.032, and
those with similar language, make law enforcement personnel the initial arbiter in deciding
whether a person is exercising a valid self-defense claim.190 If a prosecutor decides not to pursue
the cases in which police decline to investigate, law enforcement officers become the ultimate
decision-makers regarding whether or not a case is adjudicated.191 This effectively removes the
determination of the perpetrator’s innocence or guilt from the court.192 This was recognized by
the Eleventh Circuit in Reagan v. Mallory, evaluating Florida’s self-defense law.193 The court
stated that by defining criminal prosecution so broadly, the statute “allows for an immunity
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determination at any stage of the proceeding.”194 Therefore, a decision by law enforcement at
the earliest stage of the proceedings bars potentially meritorious claims from evaluation by an
objective judge or jury.
Most concerning is the fact that law enforcement must make this decision without the
benefit of the same extent of evidence normally presented to the trier of fact. In many of the
situations in which law enforcement officers must now apply the standard, all of the necessary
evidence is in the hands of the defendant.195 In the Trayvon Martin case, for example, the victim
against whom the force was used was no longer available to give his account of the
altercation.196 The only remaining evidence with which law enforcement could establish
probable cause would need to come from the very person asserting the defense, Zimmerman. It
is highly unlikely that Zimmerman would say or do anything to undermine his own asserted selfdefense, and his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination would allow him to
remain silent.197 Therefore, arrest needed to wait. In fact, Zimmerman’s assertion of selfdefense was enough to prevent the police from arresting him for several months.198 Even if
witnesses were available to deliver their interpretation of the altercation, the police would then
be required to assess the reliability of an individual’s testimony or recounting of the events, a
role typically left to the jury or the trier of fact.199
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Further, during the time between the incident and the arrest, assuming the two are not
contemporaneous because the police cannot establish the requisite probable cause, the defendant
would be permitted to live amongst the general population.200 This seems contrary to the
purported goal of the legislation to allow “law-abiding people to protect themselves.”201 This
potentially places a law-breaking citizen in the position to threaten the life or body of another
law-abiding citizen. It also provides the defendant with an opportunity for escape. The purpose
of arrest, and subsequent detention, of an individual, is not only to prevent harm to the
community, but to assure that they are made available for later proceedings.202 The possibility
for escape is exemplified in the Trayvon Martin case. George Zimmeman’s whereabouts in the
weeks following the incident were reportedly unknown.203 The attorney representing Martin’s
parents expressed concern that even if the State of Florida decided to file charges against
Zimmerman, he would be unavailable to face them.204 He stated, “[w]e’re concerned that he
might be a flight risk, that nobody knows where he’s at.”205 While police indicated that they
were in contact with Zimmerman, there was speculation that Zimmerman had left the jurisdiction
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of Florida.206 Zimmerman was eventually charged and taken into custody on April 11, 2012, and
he was ultimately acquitted on July 13, 2013.207
B. Problems for Prosecutors and Judges
The states granting immunity in the criminal context not only provide immunization from
arrest but also from charging and prosecution.208 This necessarily implicates and alters the role
of prosecutors and judges in the criminal justice process.209 Because prosecutorial decisions are
not subject to review by the court, however, it would be difficult to identify precisely how a
defendant’s assertion of self-defense affected prosecutorial decision-making prior to the
enactment of such legislation.210 After its enactment, one prosecutor stated that “the real impact
[of the law] has been that it’s making filing decisions for prosecutors. It’s causing cases to not
be filed at all or to be filed with reduced charges.”211 While this statement is difficult to
substantiate because statistics on the number of self-defense claims made are unavailable,212 it
demonstrates at the very least that some prosecutors are concerned with the law’s effect on
charging decisions. In Duval County, Florida, the State Attorney indicates that the law has
influenced the office’s decision to charge or reduce charges in a handful of cases. 213
Specifically, he cited his office’s decision not to charge electronics store owner Doug Freeman in
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the shooting of an unarmed man, Vince Hudson, in May of 2006.214 State Attorney Harry
Shorstein, though publicly siding with the wounded individual, declined to prosecute stating that
he did not believe he could get a conviction.215 Similarly, Florida State Attorney Andy Slater
cited the “Stand Your Ground” law, as well as conflicting witness testimony, as the reasons he
offered a defendant that stabbed a man at a party a particular plea agreement.216
With the imposition of pre-trial hearings on immunity, judges are also given an additional
task in the criminal justice process.
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For example, the Florida Supreme Court in Dennis v.

State adopted the pretrial immunity procedure articulated by the First District Court of Appeals
in Peterson.218 The Peterson court largely followed the Colorado court in People .v Guenther
and held that the defendant raising an immunity claim has the burden of establishing the factual
prerequisites by a preponderance of the evidence.219 Therefore, a judge hearing a case in which
the defendant asserts immunity under the “Stand Your Ground” legislation must evaluate the
defendant’s immunity claim utilizing a preponderance of the evidence standard, prior to trial.
These additional hearings also constitute an addition to the judge’s caseload that would not
otherwise exist in a jurisdiction in which a defendant is permitted to only assert an affirmative
defense of self-defense.220 By requiring additional hearings,221 these legislative hearings may
undermine judicial economy.
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V.

The Problematic Aspects of Immunity in the Civil Context

An increasingly large number of states have established provisions to allow for a
defendant’s immunity from civil liability if force is used lawfully. 222 Though there is not yet
substantial judicial interpretation, a careful analysis reveals a number of potential problems.
Specifically, the laws do not distinguish between liability for injury to the unlawful
aggressor and liability for injury to a third party.223 In fact, North Dakota is among the minority
of these states that permits immunity from civil liability but recognizes an exception for “other
persons . . . at risk of injury due to negligence or recklessness during use of force, then civil
immunity would not apply to such third persons.”224 In statutes that do not carve out this
particular exception, a person justified in utilizing force may not be held liable for injuries that
result to a third-party.225 Such a situation was exemplified in Miami-Dade County, Florida in
2006.226 As a nine-year old girl sat outside her home playing with her dolls, she was shot in the
crossfire between two men, both of whom asserted a claim of self-defense.227 If both are
successful in a claim of immunity, this eliminates any legal remedy, either civil or criminal, for
the innocent girl.228 Under the Florida statute, a deadly defense may be justified, even if it was
executed negligently or recklessly.229
Though criminal and civil self-defense cases involving the same defendant are rare, the
availability of a civil remedy has afforded some individuals or their families a remedy when the
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criminal justice system did not.230 Perhaps the most famous example of this is in the self-defense
context is the case of Bernhard Goetz.231 In Goetz, Bernhard Goetz boarded a subway train at
Fourteenth Street in Manhattan and sat down in the same car as four youths.232 In his possession
was an unlicensed .38 caliber pistol.233 One of the youths approached Goetz and stated “give me
five dollars.”234 None of the juveniles displayed a weapon.235 Goetz responded by firing four
shots at each of the four boys.236 One youth was struck in the chest, another in the back, the third
in his left side, and the fourth was initially unscathed.237 Goetz then turned to the fourth youth
and stated, “you seem to be all right, here’s another.”238 He fired a fifth bullet at the fourth
youth, severing his spinal cord.239 Goetz fled immediately following the incident.240 However,
nine days later Goetz surrendered himself to police.241

Goetz was eventually indicted for

attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, and criminal possession of a weapon.242
Goetz argued that his actions were justified as self-defense.243 New York self-defense law at the
time of the incident provided that the use of force was justified when a person “believed deadly
force was necessary to avert the imminent use of deadly force or the commission” of an
enumerated felony and, if the District Attorney did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
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or she did not have such beliefs, the jury would determine if a reasonable person could have had
such beliefs.”244
On June 16, 1986, a jury acquitted Goetz of attempted murder, assault, and reckless
endangerment.245 He was convicted only of one count of illegal weapons possession, a relatively
minor felony for which he could face a maximum of seven years confinement.246 Despite this
acquittal, Goetz was later subject to civil suit.247 Darryl Cabey, the fourth youth who suffered
from a severed spinal cord as a result of the shooting, filed a $50 million civil suit in the Bronx
Supreme Court alleging that the shots taken at his back were made “deliberately, willfully, and
with malice.”248 Cabey prevailed in this later civil suit in 1996, receiving a $43 million judgment
in his favor.249 With the enactment of provisions providing civil immunity, however, such civil
suits may no longer be filed. This would result in the denial of a remedy to a person who might
otherwise be granted damages.
VI.

Recommendations: The Need for Change or Clarification

The most effective avenue for change is to advocate for administrative change or
amendments to the existing laws to promote uniformity and to reduce the problematic
application highlighted in the previous sections.250

The following details those

recommendations.
A. Florida Legislature Should Remove “Arrest” and “Detaining in Custody” from the
Definition of Criminal Prosecution: Legislative Recommendation
244
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The legislature should remove the immunity decision from the purview of the law
enforcement decision-making by eliminating “arrest” and “detaining in custody” from the
definition of criminal prosecution in the statute. These are the areas in which the greatest
potential implementation problems exist.251 Overall, the calculation of reasonable force should
not be within the scope and duties of law enforcement. Law enforcement training in arrest
procedures does not provide the necessary foundation for the complex legal analysis associated
with assessing an individual’s unlawful use of force.252 Further, placing this responsibility on the
shoulders of law enforcement makes them the initial, and possibly final, decision-maker though
they are not equipped with the same volume of evidence that may be available later in the
prosecution. This aspect of the immunity provision also runs the risk of allowing the subjective
beliefs of an officer to prevent the prosecution of a guilty party.
With these removed, criminal prosecution would include charging and prosecuting the
defendant.253 This would place the decision largely in the hand of the prosecutor and reduce the
discretion of law enforcement in arrest decisions to the more common requirement of probable
cause that the crime has occurred. Allowing “charging” and “prosecution” to remain included in
the definition of “criminal prosecution” does not carry the same inherent problems created by the
inclusion of “arrest” and “detention.” Providing immunity to criminal defendants simply adds to
the considerations a prosecutor may need to make in deciding whether to charge or what crime to
charge a particular defendant with.
The only other impact is the addition of a requirement for pre-trial determinations of
immunity, if the court interprets the statute to function like the courts in Dennis v. State and
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People v. Guenther.254 Though such proceedings alter the common notion of self-defense as an
affirmative defense asserted at trial, they seem to function like additional pre-trial summary
judgment proceedings with likely insubstantial effect. This amendment would still allow the
statute to further the legislative goal in enactment, elimination of the fear of prosecution, because
charges could be dismissed prior to trial and the assertion of an affirmative defense. In this way,
the defendant would not be subject to complete criminal prosecution.
B. Alternatively, the State Should Require Law Enforcement to Report Investigative
Procedures Regarding Self-Defense Claims: Administrative Recommendation
Law enforcement should be required to report the assertion of self-defense claims in
order for an adequate assessment of the effects of these laws to be conducted, particularly the
effects of the provision of immunity from arrest.255 Requiring law enforcement to track the
manner in which they investigate and to log the cases that they decline to arrest would provide
greater clarity regarding the effects of the law. Based upon the data collected, it may be possible
to create a uniform procedure for assessing probable cause in self-defense claims. In order to
create such a standard, law enforcement officers should be required to report all instances in
which they decline to arrest based upon their evaluation of probable cause in a case of selfdefense. This reporting should be done to their own agency. This data would then be compiled
across the state and evaluated to examine the various practices of law enforcement and their
differing interpretations of what the law requires of them.

From this compilation the

administration would need to create usable standard for law enforcement officers investigating
assertions of self-defense.
In conjunction with a usable standard, all law enforcement officers should be required to
undergo additional training regarding the new self-defense law. This training would provide
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greater knowledge of the intricacies of the “Stand Your Ground” law to allow proper
implementation. At the moment, the confusion surrounding the law makes it difficult for anyone
to properly understand the situations in which the use of force is, in fact, considered lawful and
justified. Due to the enhanced role of law enforcement officers under these statutes, their
understanding of the law is imperative.
Further, prosecutors may also be required to report the cases in which they decline to
charge or reduce charges based primarily upon the existence of the “Stand Your Ground” law.
This would permit a more thorough understanding of the actual effects that the law has on
prosecutorial decision-making.256
VII.

Conclusion

As evidenced by highly-publicized cases such as that of Trayvon Martin, the inclusion of
immunity from criminal and civil liability in recent legislation has significant and potentially
dangerous consequences. Particularly, the expansion of the role of law enforcement in many
recent statutes provides both for inconsistent application of the statute and unwelcome results in
its implementation. While our criminal justice system seeks to promote justice, statutes making
law enforcement the initial arbiter of a person’s guilt thwart that end by preventing a case from
reaching its factual merits. Based upon this assessment, law enforcement should be required to
engage in uniform procedures or the law should be amended to remove law enforcement
discretion in arrest.

All states considering similar legislation must refrain from including

“immunity from arrest” in the statute’s construction.

35

